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1 Introduction
Automated code generation is an enabling technology for
model-based software development and promises many
beneﬁts, including higher quality and reduced turn-around
times. However, the key to realizing these beneﬁts is gener-
ator correctness: nothing is gained from replacing manual
coding errors with automatic coding errors.
Since the direct veriﬁcation of generators is unfeasi-
ble with existing techniques, “correct-by-construction” ap-
proaches have been explored. However, these remain dif-
ﬁcult to implement and to scale up, and have not seen
widespread use. Currently, generators are validated primar-
ily by testing [8], though this cannot guarantee correctness
and quickly becomes excessive. Here we follow an alterna-
tive approach based on the observation that the correctness
of the generatoris irrelevantif instead the correctnessof the
generated programs is shown individually. Similar to proof
carrying code [7], we focus on the Hoare-style certiﬁcation
ofspeciﬁcsafetyproperties. Thissimpliﬁesourtaskbutstill
leaves the problem of constructing the appropriate logical
annotations (i.e., pre-/postconditions and loop invariants),
due to their central role in Hoare-style techniques.
In the certiﬁable program generation approach, the code
generator itself is extended in such a way that it generates
the necessary annotations together with the code [3]. This
has two major disadvantages. First, the developers need to
modify the code generator in order to integrate the anno-
tation generation but sources are often not accessible, in
particular for commercial generators. Second, it is difﬁ-
cult to implement and to maintain because the annotations
are cross-cuttingconcerns, both on the object-level(i.e., the
generated program) and the meta-level (i.e., the generator).
Here we describe an alternative technique that uses a
generic post-generation annotation inference algorithm to
circumvent these problems. We exploit both the highly id-
iomatic structure of automatically generated code and the
restriction to speciﬁc safety properties. Since generated
code only constitutes a limited subset of all possible pro-
grams,the new“eureka”insights requiredingeneralremain
rare in our case. Since safety properties are simpler than
A[1,1 ]:= a1,1;
...
A[1,m]:= a1,m;
A[2,1 ]:= a2,1;
...
A[n,m]:= an,m;
for i:= 1 to n do
for j:= 1 to m do
B[i,j]:= b;
for i:= 1 to n do
for j:= 1 to m do
if i=j then
C[i,j]:= c
else
C[i,j]:= c
′;
Figure 1. Idiomatic matrix initializations
full functionalcorrectness, the requiredannotationsare also
simpler and more regular. We can thus use patterns to de-
scribe all code constructs that require annotations and tem-
plates to describe the required annotations. We use tech-
niques similar to aspect-oriented programming to add the
annotations to the generated code: the patterns correspond
to (static) point-cut descriptors, while the introduced anno-
tations correspond to advice.
The annotation inference algorithm can run completely
separately from the generator and is generic with respect to
the safety property, although we use initialization safety as
runningexamplehere. It has been implementedand applied
to certify initialization safety for code generated by AUTO-
BAYES [5] and AUTOFILTER [10].
2 Background
Idiomatic Code. Automated code generators derive low-
level code from declarative speciﬁcations. Approaches
vary, but for our purposes the details do not matter, and
we build on a template-based approach. What does matter,
however, is the fact that most generators produce idiomatic
code (i.e., code that exhibits a regular structure beyond the
syntax of the programminglanguage) by combining a ﬁnite
number of building blocks. For example, AUTOBAYES and
AUTOFILTER onlyuse threetemplatesto initializea matrix,
resulting in either straight-line code or one of two doubly-
nested loop versions (cf. Fig. 1).
The idioms are essential to our approach because they
(rather than the templates) determine the interface between
the code generator and the inference algorithm. They can
be recognized from a given code base alone, even without
1knowing the templates that produced the code. This allows
us to apply our technique to black-box generators as well.
Safety Certiﬁcation. The purpose of safety certiﬁcation is
to demonstrate that a program does not violate certain con-
ditions during its execution. A safety property is an exact
characterization of these conditions. A safety policy is a set
of Hoare rules designed to show that safe programs satisfy
the safety property of interest. In our framework the rules
are formalized using the usual Hoare triples extended with
a “shadow” environment which records safety information
related to the correspondingprogramvariables, and a safety
predicate that is added to the computed veriﬁcation condi-
tions (VCs) [2].
We use initialization safety as example but other safe-
ty properties can also be used with our algorithm, includ-
ing absence of out-of-boundsarray accesses and nil-pointer
dereferences [2, 7]. Initialization safety ensures that each
variable or individual array element has been explicitly as-
signed a value before it is used. The shadow variable ¯ x con-
tains the value INIT after the variable x has been assigned
a value; shadow arrays capture the status of the individual
elements. Only rules for statements assigning a value to a
location affect the shadow environment; the most compli-
cated cases are the loop rules which require explicit invari-
ants. Initialization safety deﬁnes an expression to be safe if
the respective shadow variables have the value INIT, so that,
e.g.,safe(x[i])simplytranslatesto¯ ı = INIT∧¯ x[i] = INIT.
VC Processing and Annotations. A VC generator (VCG)
traverses the annotated code and applies the Hoare rules to
produce VCs, starting with the postcondition true. If all
VCs are proven by an automated theorem prover (ATP),
the program is safe wrt. the safety property. However, the
ATP has no access to the programinternals; hence,all perti-
nent informationmust be taken from the annotationswhich,
in general, must be so detailed that their inference is in-
tractable. For safety certiﬁcation, however, the Hoare rules
are specialized and the safety predicates are regular and
simple, so that the required annotations are simpler.
3 Inference Algorithm
Our aim is to “get information from deﬁnitions to uses”,
i.e., to annotate the program such that the VCG has the
information necessary to show the program safe (wrt. the
given property) as it works its way back through the pro-
gram. The notions of deﬁnitions and uses are speciﬁc to the
given safety property. For initialization safety, deﬁnitions
correspond to the different initialization blocks as shown
in Fig. 1, while uses are statements which read a variable.
For array bounds safety, deﬁnitions are the array declara-
tions since the shadow variables get their values from the
declared bounds, while uses are statements which access an
array variable.
Fig.2(a)showsanexampleprogram,similartocodepro-
duced by AUTOFILTER, that initializes two vectors A and
B and computes the sums s and t of their respective ele-
ments. AUTOFILTER’s target language is a simple impera-
tive language with basic control constructs (i.e., if and for)
and numeric scalars and arrays as the only datatypes. It also
supports domain-speciﬁcoperations like matrix assignment
and multiplication that are not used in the example.
Top-level Algorithm Structure. The inference algorithm
ﬁrst scans the code for relevant variables. For each vari-
able, it builds an abstracted control ﬂow graph where irrel-
evant parts of the program are collapsed into single nodes.
It then follows all paths backwards from the variable’s use
nodes until it encounters either a cycle or a deﬁnition node
forthe variable. Paths that do not end in a deﬁnitionare dis-
carded and the remaining paths are traversed node by node.
Annotations are added to all intermediate nodes that other-
wise constitute barriers to the information ﬂow before the
deﬁnitions themselves are annotated.
Patterns and Pattern Matching. We use patterns to cap-
ture the idiomatic code structures and pattern matching to
ﬁnd the corresponding code locations. Our pattern lan-
guage is a tree-based regular expression language similar
to XPath. It supports matching of tree literals, wildcards
( ), optional (?), list (*) and non-empty list (+) pat-
terns, as well as alternation ( | | ) and concatenation (;).
P1 ∈ P2 matches all terms that match P2 and have at last
one subterm that matches P1 and similarly for P1 ∈ /P2. We
use meta-variables in patterns to introduce context depen-
dency: an uninstantiated meta-variable matches any term
but it then becomes instantiated and subsequently match-
es only other instances of the matched term. For ex-
ample, the pattern ( [ ]:= )+ matches the entire state-
ment list A[1]:=1;A[2]:=2;B[1]:=1 while the pat-
tern (x[ ]:= )+ matches only the two assignments to A
but not the ﬁnal assignment to B, due to the instantiation of
x with A. Meta-variablesare instantiated eagerlybut instan-
tiations are undone if the enclosing pattern fails later on.
Hot Variable Identiﬁcation. Proving a program safe re-
quires annotationsat the points where the VCG needs infor-
mation about the contents of the essential shadow variables.
The algorithm thus ﬁrst passes through the program to de-
termine which variable uses are essential or “hot”, i.e., for
which there are barriers (mainly loops) to the information
ﬂow alongthe pathsto all deﬁnitions. Since thesystem con-
structsannotationsonlyforthesehotvariables,theymust be
approximatedconservatively; we focus on the hot uses of A
and B in lines 5.2 and 5.3.
AbstractedControlFlow Graphs. Thealgorithmuses ab-
stracted control ﬂow graphs (CFGs), in which code frag-
ments matching speciﬁc patterns are collapsed into indi-
vidual nodes. Since the patterns can depend on the vari-
ables, separate abstracted CFGs must be constructed for
21.1
1.2
1.3
2.1
2.n
3.1
3.2
4.1
4.2
5.1
5.2
5.3
const N:= n;
var i,s,t;
var A[1:N],B[1:N];
A[1]:= a1;
···
A[n]:= an;
for i:=1 to N do
B[i]:= b;
s:=0;
t:=0;
for i:=1 to N do
s:=s+A[i];
t:=t+B[i];
(a)
const N:= n;
var i,s,t;
var A[1:N],B[1:N];
A[1]:= a1;
···
A[n]:= an;
def(B[1:N]);
s:=0;
t:=0;
for i:=1 to N do
t:=t+A[i];
use(B);
(b)
const N:= n;
var i,s,t;
var A[1:N],B[1:N];
A[1]:= a1;
···
A[n]:= an;
for i:=1 to N do
inv ∀j∈{1:i−1}· ¯ B[j]=INIT
B[i]:= b;
post ∀j∈{1:N}· ¯ B[j]=INIT
s:=0;
t:=0;
for i:=1 to N do
inv ∀j∈{1:N}· ¯ B[j]=INIT
s:=s+A[i];
t:=t+B[i];
(c)
block(A);
def(A[1:N]);
barrier(A);
block(A);
for i:=1 to N do
use(A);
block(A);
(d)
const N:= n;
var i,s,t;
var A[1:N],B[1:N];
A[1]:= a1;
···
A[n]:= an;
post ∀j∈{1:n}· ¯ A[j]=INIT
for i:=1 to N do
inv ∀j∈{1:n}· ¯ A[j]=INIT
∧ ∀j∈{1:i−1}· ¯ B[j]=INIT
B[i]:= b;
post ∀j∈{1:n}· ¯ A[j]=INIT
∧ ∀j∈{1:N}· ¯ B[j]=INIT
s:=0;
t:=0;
for i:=1 to N do
inv ∀j∈{1:n}· ¯ A[j]=INIT
∧ ∀j∈{1:N}· ¯ B[j]=INIT
s:=s+A[i];
t:=t+B[i];
(e)
Figure 2. (a) Original program (b) Abstraction for B (c) Annotations for B (d) Abstraction for A (using
block- and barrier-patterns) (e) Annotations inferred for A and B
each hot variable. CFG construction ﬁrst matches the pro-
gram against the different patterns and, in the case of a
match, constructs a single node of the class corresponding
to the pattern, rather than recursively descending into the
statements. The algorithm constructs use- and def-nodes
and uses barrier- and block-nodes as optimizations to rep-
resent code that can be regarded as opaque (to different de-
grees) because it contains no deﬁnition for the given vari-
able. Both are treated as atomic nodes during path search,
which drastically reduces the number of paths that need be
explored. barrier-nodes represent code that requires anno-
tations, mainly loops. They must be re-expanded and tra-
versed during the annotation phase of the algorithm. block-
nodes are irrelevant to the hot variable because they neither
require annotations (i.e., contain no barriers) nor contribute
to annotations (i.e., contain no deﬁnition). They remain
atomic during the annotation phase, i.e., are not entered on
path traversal. Blocks are usually loop-free sequences of
assignments and conditionals.
AnnotationofNodes andPaths. ForB, theCFG construc-
tion identiﬁes the for-loop in lines 3.1-3.2 as the deﬁnition
forthe entire array B andabstracts it into the deﬁnitionnode
def(B[1:N]), cf. (Fig. 2(b). The path search then starts
at the hot use in line 5.3 (abstracted into use(B)) and goes
straight back up to the for-loop at line 5.1, where it splits.
One branch passes through the bottom of the loop body
but this immediately leads to a cycle and is therefore dis-
carded. The other branch continues through lines 4.1 and
4.2 to terminate at the deﬁnition node at line 3.1. Since
all branches have been exhausted, there is only one path
along which annotations need to be added. The annotation
process starts with the use and proceeds towards the deﬁni-
tion terminating the path. Every node needs to be inspect-
ed, but in this case only the for-loop at line 5.1 requires an
invariant. Since the traversal must take control ﬂow into
account, the current annotation is computed from the WPC
of the previous annotation for the current node. This can
be considerably more complicated than for the simple ex-
ample given, but in general the form of all annotations is
fully determined by the safety property, and in the case of
a deﬁnition, its known syntactic structure as described by
the pattern. The annotation knowledge is represented by
annotation schemas, which are the core of the whole sys-
tem. They take a match (identifying the pattern and the lo-
cation), and use meta-programming to construct and insert
the annotations. Here, the deﬁnition is a loop, so it needs
a loop invariant and a postcondition. Since the safety prop-
erty is initialization safety, both invariant and postcondition
need to formalize that the shadow variable ¯ B correspond-
ing to the current array variable B records the value INIT for
the entries already initialized. Fig. 2(c) shows the partially
annotated program after this pass.
The next pass adds the annotations for A. It is initial-
ized using a different idiom—a sequence of assignments,
cf. Fig. 2(d), lines 2.1–2.n—whichis again collapsed into a
def-node. The programis collapsed furtherby the introduc-
3tion of barrier- and block-nodes. The barrier-nodes must
be re-expandedduringthe path traversal phase because they
require annotations (cf. line 3.1) while the block-nodes re-
main opaque. Except for this special handling, the algo-
rithm proceeds as before, and Fig. 2(e) shows the resulting
fully annotated program.
Notethatthedeﬁnitionsandthepathsareuntrusted;their
correctness is established by the annotations, which are
themselves untrusted and ultimately checked by the ATP.
4 Experiences
We have implemented the generic inference algorithm and
used an instantiation to certify initialization safety for code
generated by AUTOBAYES and AUTOFILTER. This re-
quired only a small “declarative content”, i.e., only pattern
deﬁnitions but no changes to the core algorithm itself.
AutoFilter. For AUTOFILTER, the deﬁnitions are given by
two of the matrix initialization idioms in Fig. 1, along with
the scalar and matrix assignment operations := and ::=.
defAF(x) ::= x:= | | x::=
| | (x[ , ]:= )+
| | fori := to do forj := to do
if thenx[i,j]:= elsex[i,j]:=
The pattern is parametrized overthe hot variable x and uses
“free” meta-variables i and j that are bound to the actual
index variables of the matched loop. Barriers are deﬁned as
for-loopswithout anyoccurrenceof the hot variable. Loops
with the hot variable are then simply treated by the normal
CFG-routines, i.e., not collapsed. Finally, blocks are condi-
tionals whose branches are irrelevant because they contain
no occurrence of a barrier or the hot variable.
barrierAF(x) ::= x ∈ /(for := to do )
blockAF(x) ::= if(x ∈ / )thenirr(x)elseirr(x)
| | for := to doirr(x)
Here irr(x) = (x| |barrierAF(x))∈ / is an auxiliary pattern
blocking all occurrences of the hot variable or a barrier. We
omit the easy pattern for uses.
AutoBayes. AUTOBAYES requires additional for-loop pat-
terns but does not need the ::=-pattern since it does not gen-
erate direct matrix operations. It has two additional lan-
guageconstructs,abort,whichappearsinthedeﬁnitionpat-
tern, and while-loops, which can form additional barriers.
Blocks and uses are the same as for AUTOFILTER.
Results. For AUTOFILTER, annotation inference proves to
be very similar to the previous certiﬁable program genera-
tion approach. The inferred annotations are slightly larger
(by 15–25%)than the generated ones but, due to simpliﬁca-
tions, they produce fewer VCs, and all VCs are proven by
the ATP. For AUTOBAYES, annotation generation has not
kept up with ongoing generator development and the orig-
inal annotations are now insufﬁcient to prove the programs
safe. Usingannotationinferencewiththe patternsdescribed
above,we can alreadycertifysome programsbut morecode
patterns are required to cover the entire range of programs.
Since it needs to build and traverse the CFGs, the in-
ference approach is slower than the generation approach,
which only needs to expand templates. However, the over-
all prooftimes are comparable,indicatingthat the inference
does not introduce new complexity for the ATP.
5 Conclusions
Early work used a combination of logical inference and
heuristics to push an initial annotation forward through the
program [9]; this proved to be computationally expensive
and ineffective. Dynamic [4] and static [6] generate-and-
test methods have also been used but they are much less
goal-oriented than our approach and require refutation of
many invalid annotation candidates.
In our previous certiﬁable program generation approach,
extensions and modiﬁcations to the code generators had
over time led to a situation of “entropic decay” where the
generated annotations had not kept up with the generated
code. The new certiﬁcation system based on annotation in-
ference is able to automatically certify the same programs
as the original system, as well as some subsequent exten-
sions. However,the re-constructionis notyet complete, and
we continue to extend the new system. These extensions
require less effort than before since the patterns and annota-
tion schemas are expressed declaratively and in one place,
in contrast to the previous decentralized architecture where
certiﬁcation information is distributed throughout the code
generator. Our new approach offers a general framework
for augmenting code generators with a certiﬁcation compo-
nent, and we have started a project to applyit to MathWorks
Real-Time Workshop [1].
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